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Abstract—We introduce a new class of lower overhead tunnel
that is resistant to traffic analysis. The tunnel opportunistically
reduces the number of dummy packets transmitted during
busy times when many flows are simultaneously active while
maintaining well-defined privacy properties. We find that the
dummy packet overhead is typically less than 20% on lightly
loaded links and falls to zero as the traffic load increases i.e.
the tunnel is capacity-achieving. The additional latency incurred
is less than 100ms. We build an experimental prototype of
the tunnel and carry out an extensive performance evaluation
that demonstrates its effectiveness under a range of network
conditions and real web page fetches.
Index Terms—Timing-analysis attacks, Traffic analysis de-
fence, Website fingerprinting, Network privacy, VPN.
I. INTRODUCTION
Encrypting traffic to protect it from eavesdroppers is one of
the basic building blocks of secure networks. However, while
encryption conceals the contents of transmitted packets other
features of the transmitted packet stream, such as the packet
sizes and timings, often still contain revealing information.
Taking advantage of this, over the last 10 years a number of
increasingly powerful attacks have been demonstrated against
encrypted packet streams, and encrypted web traffic in par-
ticular. While attacks against HTTPS were initially based on
packet sizes and counts, attacks using only packet timing
information have recently been demonstrated, e.g. [7]. The
importance of the latter is that they are immune to defences
currently being rolled out, such as padding packets to make
them all the same size, plus they do not require a priori
knowledge of the start and end of each web fetch. Such
developments motivate revisiting how we transmit encrypted
traffic.
Three main approaches to defence have been considered to
date. One is to obfuscate the timing of information packets
by transmitting packets at a constant rate, using buffering and
insertion of dummy packets as needed [5], [4], [3]. While
effective at disrupting attacks, this is recognised to involve
such high overheads as to be unsuitable for general use.
A second, application-layer, approach is to randomise the
pipelining of the requests forming the fetch a web page and
also to inject dummy requests [15]. However, while incurring
a low overhead (few dummy packets and low latency) this
is largely ineffective against modern attacks [2], [21], [12].
A third line of work is based on shaping traffic so that
the transmitted trace is similar, in some appropriate sense,
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to that for a different web page or application [23], [17],
[21], [22]. However, either these approaches are of limited
effectiveness [2], [21], [7] or again entail high overheads [17],
[21], [22]. In summary, existing defences are either of limited
ineffectiveness or carry an excessive overhead.
In this paper we introduce a new class of lower overhead
tunnel that is resistant to traffic analysis. The basic idea
used is to ensure that, given an observed packet trace, many
different sequences of web fetches could reasonably generate
this trace. Users are therefore provided strong deniability that
a specific web page was fetched. This indistinguishability
idea is not new, but the approach used to realise it is novel.
Important features are that (i) our approach is lightweight and
does not, for example, require pre-clustering of web pages
(and so maintainance of a packet trace database etc) and
(ii) packets from multiple web fetches/flows are aggregated
thereby allowing us to opportunistically reduce the num-
ber of dummy packets transmitted during busy times when
many flows are simultaneously active while maintaining well-
defined privacy properties. We find that the dummy packet
overhead is typically less than 20% on lightly loaded links.
Further, the fraction of dummy packets falls to zero as the
traffic load increases i.e. the tunnel is capacity-achieving.
The additional latency introduced by the tunnel is less than
100ms. Importantly, we build an experimental prototype of
the tunnel and carry out an extensive performance evaluation
that demonstrates its effectiveness under a range of network
conditions and real web page fetches. The importance of using
a working implementation is twofold. Firstly, the buffering
associated with traffic shaping affects the behaviour of the
web fetch, e.g. delay of a request has knock-on effects on the
timing of the response which may in turn affect subsequent
requests, and such interactions are not captured by the usual
simulation approach of replaying a recorded packet sequence.
Secondly, practical issues such as handling of DNS requests
and interactions between traffic shaping and TCP congestion
control, which have received little attention in the traffic
analysis literature, are highlighted.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II
we formalise the threat model considered and set the present
work in the context of the existing literature. Section III
introduces the use of a trace-based traffic shaping approach
to achieve indistinguishability and in Section IV we show
that it is possible to perform traffic shaping in a way that,
while ensuring indistinguishability, reduces the dummy packet
overhead during busy times and importantly that the fraction
of dummy packets falls to zero as the traffic load increases.
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Fig. 1: Schematic illustrating attacker of the type considered.
A client machine is connected to an external network via an
encrypted tunnel (ssh, SSL, IPSec etc.). The attacker can sniff
packets traversing the tunnel, but has no other information
about the clients activity.
Section V presents experimental measurements on the perfor-
mance of a prototype VPN implementing the proposed ap-
proach, evaluating a number of design choices and presenting
performance data for both TCP and UDP traffic. Section VI
evaluates the performance of the tunnel against a state of the
art traffic analysis attack and also compares its performance
with other proposed defences based on indistinguishability.
Our conclusions are summarised in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Threat Model
The privacy disclosure scenario we consider arises naturally
from the prevalence of relatively easy access to the network
path connecting a client device to the internet. We imagine
two main types of attack/threat:
1) The first hop is a WiFi link and a nearby device equipped
with a wireless interface sniffs packets transmitted across
the wireless hop.
2) ISPs and hot spot providers sniff the packets carried on
the DSL/cable/ethernet link connecting the edge network
to the internet.
Notice that the sensitive asset here is the packet trace, consist-
ing of the time when a packet is transmitted together with the
packet header and contents. We assume that packet contents
are encrypted and packets are padded to be of the same size,
that is the user already has baseline defences in place by
routing traffic via a suitable tunnel as illustrated schematically
in Figure 1. The relevant part of the packet trace for an attacker
therefore consists of the timing of packet transmissions.
We focus on web traffic, since this is a major source of
traffic in the internet and has been the subject of much of the
literature on traffic analysis attacks. We do not seek to conceal
the fact that the client device is browsing the web, but rather
to prevent an attacker from inferring which pages are being
browsed. Packet timing data is a rich source of information,
as discussed in more detail in Section II-B below, and in
particular it is known to be sufficient to allow an attacker
to infer with high probability the web page being browsed
by a user [7] while in [5] it is shown that packet padding is
not sufficient to hide coarse grained features such as bursts in
traffic or the total size and load time of a page.
Although a client device may transmit packets from multiple
flows, e.g. web and email, across its internet link, we want
to avoid making strong assumptions about the number and
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Fig. 2: Time traces of uplink traffic from 5 different Irish
health-related web sites are shown. It can be seen that the
web site time traces exhibit distinct patterns. The traces are
shifted vertically to avoid overlap and facilitate comparison.
Figure reprinted from [7].
characteristics of flows since this can change over time in
ways that are difficult to predict i.e. we require a defence that
provides a reasonable level of protection whether a single web
fetch is in progress or many parallel flows are active. That said,
we expect that flow re-identification attacks may sometimes be
harder to carry out when many flows are active simultaneously
and of course a defence can and should opportunistically take
advantage of this e.g. to reduce the overheads induced by the
defence.
Note that we do not seek to address attacks that target the
end host itself (viruses etc), nor attacks based on active packet
injection by the attacker ( e.g. to force packet loss so as to
manipulate user or web server behaviour).
B. Anatomy of a Web Page Fetch
We briefly review the reasons why packet timing infor-
mation can be highly informative. When traffic is encrypted
the packet source and destination addresses and ports and the
packet payload are hidden and the packets may be padded to be
of equal size, so that packet size information is also concealed.
An attacker sniffing such encrypted traffic is therefore able
only to observe the direction and timing of packets. Figure
2 plots the timestamps of the uplink packets sent during
the course of fetching five different health-related web pages
(see below for details of the measurement setup). The x-axis
indicates the packet number k within the stream and the y-
axis indicates the corresponding timestamp. It can be seen that
these timestamp traces are distinctly different for each web
site.
To gain insight into the differences between the packet
timestamp sequences in Figure 2, it is helpful to consider the
process of fetching a web page in more detail. To fetch a web
page the client browser starts by opening a TCP connection
with the server indicated by the URL and issues an HTTP GET
or POST request to which the server then replies. As the client
parses the server response it issues additional GET/POST
requests to fetch embedded objects (images, css, scripts etc.).
3These additional requests may be to different servers from
the original request (e.g. when the object to be fetched is an
advert or is hosted in a separate content-delivery network),
in which case the client opens a TCP connection to each
new server in order to issue the requests. Fetching of these
objects may in turn trigger the fetching of further objects.
Note that asynchronous fetching of dynamic content using,
e.g. AJAX, can lead to a complex sequence of server requests
and responses even after the page has been rendered by the
browser. Also, typically the TCP connections to the various
servers are held open until the page is fully loaded so that
they can be reused for later requests (request pipelining in
this way is almost universally used by modern browsers). It
is this sequence of events while fetching the objects in a page
that creates a packet timing “signature” which can be used to
deanonymise the encrypted traffic and estimate the web page
fetched with high probability. For example, in [7] web pages
are correctly identified with > 90% success rate.
C. Related Work
1) Attacks: With regard to attacks, a fairly large body of
literature now exists. Some of the earliest work specifically
focussed on attacks against encrypted web traffic appears to
be that of Hintz [11]. In this setup (i) web page fetches occur
sequentially with the start and end of each web page fetch
known, and for each packet (ii) the client-side port number,
(iii) the direction (incoming/outgoing) and (iv) the size is ob-
served. A web page signature is constructed consisting of the
aggregate bytes received on each port (calculated by summing
packet sizes), effectively corresponding to the number and size
of each object within the web page.
Subsequently, Bissias et al [1] considered an encrypted
tunnel setup where (i) web page fetches occur sequentially
with the start and end of each web page fetch known, and for
each packet (ii) the size, (iii) the direction (incoming/outgoing)
and (iv) the time (and so also the packet ordering) is observed.
The sequence of packet inter-arrival times and packet sizes
from a web page fetch is used to create a profile for each
web page in a target set and the cross correlation between an
observed traffic sequence and the stored profiles is then used
as a measure of similarity.
Most later work has adopted essentially the same model as
[1], making use of packet direction and size information and
assuming that the packet stream has already been partitioned
into individual web page fetches. For example in [21] the
timing information is not considered in the feature set, hence
the attack can be countered with defences such as BuFLO
in [5] leading to a success rate of only 10%. In [13], [10]
Bayes classifiers based on the direction and size of packets
are considered while in [19] an SVM classifier is proposed.
In [14] classification based on direction and size of packets
is studied using Levenshtein distance as the similarity metric,
in [16] using a Gaussian Bag-of-Words approach and in [21]
using K-NN classification. In [2] using a SVM approach a
classification accuracy of over 80% is reported for both SSH
and Tor traffic and the defences considered were generally
found to be ineffective. Similarly, [5] considers Bayes and
SVM classifiers and finds that a range of proposed defences
are ineffective. In [9] remote inference of packet sizes from
queuing delay is studied.
Recently, powerful attacks based on using packet timing
information alone have been demonstrated [7]. Such attacks
are immune to defences based on packet padding etc, do not
require a priori knowledge of the start/end of a web fetch and
have low false positive rates in open-world settings where the
set of web sites being browsed is not restricted to a defined
set.
2) Defences: With regard to defences, one fairly obvious
approach to obfuscating the timing of information packets is to
transmit packets at a constant rate, inserting dummy packets
when an information packet is not available to send (when
encrypted dummy packets are indistinguishable from informa-
tion packets to an attacker), and buffering information packets
when a transmit slot is not available. This type of strategy is
considered in detail by [5], although to reduce the bandwidth
overhead transmission only continues until either a page has
loaded or a minimum time has elapsed. It is concluded that
this approach, referred to as BuFLO (Buffered Fixed-Length
Obfuscator), involves excessive bandwidth overhead (>100%)
and high latency (a ×2-3 increase) in return for uncertain
security (the duration of pages longer than the minimum
time is still revealed). Tamaraw [4] and CS BuFLO [3] both
attempt to refine BuFLO. Tamaraw ends transmission only
at fixed multiples of a design parameter L which allows for
stronger security guarantees at the cost of increased overhead.
CS BuFLO adjusts the transmit rate based on traffic load.
In view of the high overheads associated with constant
rate transmission, a number of alternative approaches have
been considered. In HTTPOS [15] and the work of Wright
et al [23] packet timing is modified by injecting dummy
HTTP requests and randomising the pipelining of the requests
forming the fetch a web page. Randomised pipelining is also
used in Tor. However, this defence has been shown to be of
limited effectiveness at protecting against attacks in several
subsequent evaluations [2], [21], [12]. Another line of work
is based on shaping traffic so that the transmitted trace is
similar, in some appropriate sense, to that for a different web
page or application. In early work [23] traffic morphing is
considered whereby packet padding/splitting is used so that
the distribution of packet sizes over a web fetch resembles that
of a target web page. However this was found to be ineffective
against later attacks [2], [21] and packet padding also provides
little defence against attacks based only on timing information
such as that of [7]. In [17] anonymity sets are created by
clustering the packet traces for web page fetches and morphing
them to look like the centroid of their cluster. A similar
approach is considered by [21], [22]. However, in addition
to still entailing a relatively high bandwidth overhead (>60%)
these approaches also require maintaining a database of packet
traces that may be both large and strongly dependent on the
location of a client device (e.g. when moved from work to
home, or between hot spots with different qualities of network
connection).
On links carrying multiple web fetches interleaving of pack-
ets from these fetches can be expected to make it harder for an
4attacker to infer the web pages being browsed. Intuitively, the
inference task of the attacker becomes that of estimating the
components of a mixture, which can be expected to increase
in difficulty as the number of components (web fetches)
increases. The great advantage of this approach is that it
avoids the costs associated with buffering and injecting dummy
packets. However, it relies on the availability of sufficiently
many active fetches at any given time. Further, while only a
limited number of studies have been carried out that evaluate
the protection provided by combining multiple web fetches,
generally the results point towards this approach being of
limited effectiveness against modern attacks, see for example
[2]. In summary, it is difficult to quantify the degree of privacy
provided at any given time when relying on interleaving of
multiple fetches, and due to its opportunistic nature it is
probably inherently impossible to provide up front guarantees
of privacy to users using this type of approach.
III. ACHIEVING PRIVACY
In this section we discuss how traffic shaping can be used
to ensure indistinguishability i.e that a given packet trace can
be explained by several combinations of web fetches. While
this can be trivially achieved by sending packets at a constant
rate and using buffering plus insertion of dummy packets as
required, the overhead involved is excessive. The challenge
is to strike a balance between indistinguishability and the
associated traffic shaping overheads of buffering delay and
dummy packets.
We make two main observations. Firstly, traffic shaping can
be adapted on the fly using what we refer to as a trace-
based approach. As alternative is offline optimisation of a
traffic profile using a database of web fetch packet traces.
However, while this can lead to traffic profiles which use
a lower number of dummy packets, it can be difficult to
deal with previously unseen web pages. Secondly, rather than
applying traffic shaping to each web fetch individually we
instead apply shaping to the aggregate traffic sharing a tunnel.
This small change has significant consequences. When shaping
is applied to web fetches individually then the overhead per
fetch is fixed and thus the overall tunnel overhead of scales
with the number of fetches e.g. if the overhead is 100% for
a fetch of 100 packets then for 100 fetches the overhead is
10,000 packets. In contrast, when shaping is applied to the
aggregate traffic then as the traffic load increases the overhead
falls to zero since there are always useful packets available to
send and so no need to insert dummy packets.
The rest of the section proceeds as follows. In Section III-A
we discuss indistinguishability in more detail. Then in Section
III-B we introduce our online adaptive trace-based approach
and in Section III-C the reduction in dummy packet overhead
obtained by shaping of aggregated traffic.
A. Indistinguishability
As already noted, we are not concerned with concealing
the fact that the user is browsing the web but rather with
concealing the particular pages visited. Privacy is therefore
embodied in the indistinguishability of sequences of web
time
packet
rate
information packets
dummy packets
t
0 t0+T
r
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Illustrating use of dummy packets to force the number
and timing of transmitted packets to conform to an unin-
formative pattern or “trace”. When insufficient information
packets are available, dummy packets are inserted as needed
as indicated in figure (a). When too many information packets
are available they are buffered until a transmission opportunity
becomes available. Additional traces can be activated when
the duration of a web fetch exceeds that of a single trace, top
figure in (b), or when the rate is greater than that of a single
trace, bottom figure in (b).
fetches given with regard to the packet sequences which they
generate.
It is important to note that we do not insist that fetches
of single web pages individually be indistinguishable. Rather,
we require that the observed packet sequence corresponding
to the fetch of each web page can be reasonably explained by
other combinations of web fetches. So, for example, the packet
sequence generated by the fetch of a large web page could
equally have been generated by sufficiently many sequences
of fetches of small web pages. Fetches of single web pages
must still be indistinguishable from one another when they
cannot plausibly be generated by combinations of other page
fetches. That is, we require fetches of sufficiently small web
pages to be atomic in the sense that they are indistinguishable
from one another.
B. Defence By Use of “Traces”
The basic problem with the packet sequence generated by
a web fetch is that it contains many packets (often several
hundred, frequently more) and so amounts to an observation
of a point in high dimensional space. It is increasingly recog-
nised that high dimensional data carries a major risk of de-
anonymisation since data points tend to be sparsely distributed
in high dimensions (each point can be individually distin-
guished). Our approach is therefore to reduce the dimension
of the observed packet sequence data. We do this by gathering
packets into larger groups and transmitting these groups in a
uniform way.
The approach is illustrated in Figure 3a. Here, a web fetch
starts at time t0. Dummy packets (indicated in grey) are
inserted so that the observed sequence of packets, which is a
combination of dummy plus user packets, has a uniform profile
and duration. We refer to this uniform profile as a “trace”.
Formally, a trace consists of a sequence of {(τi, pi), i =
50 1 2 time
number
of
active 
traces
1
2
Fig. 4: Example illustrating an observed sequence of traces.
1, 2, . . . , n}, with τj > τi for i > j. This says that at time
τi after the start of the trace pi packets are to be transmitted.
The duration of the trace is τn−τ1 and the number of packets
contained in the trace is P =
∑n
i=1 pi. In the rest of this
paper we will use traces with uniform pi = p, i = 1, . . . , n
and evenly spaced τi = (i − 1)T/n, where T is the trace
duration. The rate p and duration T of the trace are design
parameters, that we will return to later1. In this example the
web fetch completes by time t0+T and so fits within a single
trace. However, if the duration exceeded T then a second trace
would be started so as to mask the additional user packets,
see upper schematic in Figure 3b. Similarly, if the rate at
which user packets arrive much exceeds the rate of a trace
then two traces can be started in parallel, see lower schematic
in Figure 3b. With this approach the observed packet sequence
now consists of a sequence of traces.
We note that [17], [21], [22] also consider indistinguishabil-
ity, doing this through the creation of so-called anonymity sets
by clustering the packet traces for web page fetches. However
the approach considered here differs in a number of important
and fundamental respects. One is that the sequence of traces
is constructed on the fly as packets are transmitted. There is
no need to pre-cluster web fetches and construct a trace in
advance for each cluster, therefore also no need to maintain a
history of web fetches (needed to perform pre-clustering) nor
to explicitly adapt to location and time (which may change
the link characteristics and so the packet traces and their
clusters). A second key difference is that packets from multiple
web fetches/flows can be packed together into the same trace,
thereby allowing us to opportunistically reduce the number
of dummy packets transmitted during busy times when many
flows are simultaneously active while maintaining well-defined
privacy properties. We discuss these in more detail below,
where we show that they allow a tunnel based on our trace-
based approach to be capacity achieving i.e. as the traffic load
increases the number of dummy packets sent falls to zero.
Given an observed sequence of traces, the indistinguishabil-
ity question becomes: how many different sequences of web
fetches can reasonably generate the observed trace sequence.
The analysis is basically that of a packing problem, namely
given an observed sequence of traces what combinations of
web fetches can be packed into that sequence. Since all
web pages may not be equally likely to be fetched, if we
know the probability of fetching each page we can use this
1We might also use a trace where the pi are not constant and the τi are not
evenly spaced, and also allow the trace used to be drawn from a pre-defined
set of traces.
to calculate the probability of each combinations of web
fetches. For plausible deniability we need there to be several
combinations with reasonably high probability. There are two
main difficulties with actually carrying out such calculations
however. One is that the probability of fetching a page is
usually unknown and user dependent, although it might be
estimated from historical data. The other is that the pages
fetched may be correlated, and again would have to be
estimated from historical data. With these caveats in mind,
we give a simple example calculation for illustrative purposes.
Consider the sequence of traces shown in Figure 4. Time is
slotted, with each slot corresponding to the duration of a trace.
Traces start at the beginning of a slot, and suppose a maximum
of n traces are possible in each slot (e.g. limited by the link
capacity). Suppose we have a set W of web pages of interest.
Of these, fetches for web pages W1 ⊂ W can be covered by
one trace, W2 ⊂ W by two traces and so on. Let qw be the
probability that web page w ∈ W is fetched and assume, for
simplicity, that pages are fetched independently. Let Xw be
a random variable which takes value 1 when web page w is
fetched and 0 otherwise. Let T ⊂ {0, n}k denote the observed
sequence of traces of length k slots, with T = (1, 2, 0, . . . , 0)
in Figure 4 . Then,
P(Xw = 1|T,w ∈W1) = 1−
k∏
j=1
(
1−
qw∑
i∈W1
qi
)Tj
(1)
and similarly we can calculate P(Xw = 1|T,w ∈W2) etc. In
the example in Figure 4 suppose ww = 1/|W |. Then for a web
page w ∈W1 that fits inside a single trace the probability that
it was fetched is 1 −
(
1− 1|W1|
)(
1− 1|W1|
)2
. For example,
when |W1| = 100 this probability is 0.03 and when |W1| =
1000 the probability is 0.003 and it can be seen that provided
the cardinality of W1 is reasonably large a user can with high
plausibility deny that they fetched a given web page.
Note that in the above example an attacker can infer that the
user did not fetch any web pages that cannot fit inside three
traces or fewer. However, given the extremely large number
of possible web pages and the fact that most of these pages
are not fetched by a given user we argue that the absence of
a fetch for a web site is much less informative to an attacker
than the presence of a fetch.
We note also that the option exists to inject dummy traces
into the tunnel link to add a further level of deniability.
Using such an approach the potential exists to formulate
indistinguishability as a form of differential privacy. Namely,
such that the addition of the fetch of any individual web page
has limited impact on the sequence of traces observed on the
link. However, we leave this as future work and do not pursue
it further here.
C. Impact of Rate and Duration of a Trace on Overhead
By buffering user packets at the tunnel ingress until enough
are available to fill a trace we can avoid the overhead of
sending dummy packets. However, this comes at the cost of
increased delay, perhaps much increased delay. However, in
modern networks quality of service is frequently achieved
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Fig. 5: Illustrating the overhead of dummy packets vs trace
duration. Data is for Alexa’s top 100 web pages.
by over-provisioning of network capacity and as a result
bandwidth is often relatively plentiful. Conversely, users are
known to be sensitive to delay when using online services. For
example, Amazon estimates that a 100ms increase in delay
reduces its revenue by 1% [8], Google measured a 0.74%
drop in web searches when delay was artificially increased
by 400ms [24] while Bing saw a 1.2% reduction in per-user
revenue when the service delay was increased by 500ms [20].
Hence, in order to enhance resistance to traffic analysis attacks
it is preferable to sacrifice some bandwidth by sending dummy
packets rather than incurring excessive delay.
To gain some insight into the overhead of dummy packets
associated with different durations of trace we fetched the
home pages from the Alexa top 100 finance and health web
sites in Ireland. Figure 5a plots the average fraction of packets
in a trace which are dummy packets vs the number of web
sites that fit inside the trace. A trace of duration 10890ms
is needed to cover all 100 web sites and a trace of duration
4947ms to cover 50 web sites. As might be expected, the
fraction of dummy packets increases as the duration of the
trace is increased to include more web pages. When all 100
web pages fit inside a single trace the overhead is around
70% but this falls to around 30% for a trace that covers 50
web pages. Figure 5b plots the fraction of dummy packets
vs the maximum number of consecutive traces used to cover
all 100 web pages (so the value for one trace corresponds
to the data in Figure 5a). It can be seen that as the number
of traces used increases the overhead falls. However, use of
smaller traces reduces the level of indistinguisability provided
and so a trade-off exists between privacy and dummy packet
overhead.
Importantly, the trade-off between privacy and dummy
packet overhead also depends on the number of flows si-
multaneously active, since packets from multiple flows can
be packed together into the same trace thereby reducing the
number of dummy packets needed without compromising
privacy. This is illustrated in Figure 6, which plots the fraction
of dummy packets against the number of simultaneous flows
(here a flow is a sequence of fetched pages randomly selected
from Alexa’s top 100 web pages). It can be seen that as the
number of flows increases, the level of dummy traffic falls
towards zero. We will show analytically in the next section
that the trace-based method is, in fact, capacity achieving as
the traffic load increases, in contrast to previous traffic shaping
approaches that come with privacy guarantees.
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Fig. 6: Illustrating the overhead of dummy packets vs the
number of simultaneous flows. Each flow is a sequence of
fetched pages randomly selected from Alexa’s top 100 web
pages. Uniform traces of duration 5000ms and rate of 0.2 pkt/s
are activated every 5 seconds, number of which corresponds
to the incoming traffic load. Each box plot represent 100
measurements.
Since it is hard to analytically quantify the trade-off between
privacy, dummy packet overhead and delay (the delay aspect is
especially difficult to analyse mathematically), we will revisit
this trade-off shortly using experimental data.
IV. THROUGHPUT AND DUMMY PACKET OVERHEAD
A privacy-enhanced tunnel using the trace approach starts
up traces2 dynamically so as to manage user delay and dummy
packet overhead while ensuring privacy. In this section we
consider policies for start-up of traces and analyse how the
dummy packet overhead changes with the traffic load (analysis
of delay is left to the experimental section below). We develop
a scheduling policy that has the following important properties:
1) Adaptive. The number of dummy packets transmitted
adapts with the traffic load. When the traffic load is light
the scheduling policy inserts dummy packets as needed
to fill out the active packet trace(s) and thus maintain
privacy.
2) Capacity Achieving. The number of dummy packets falls
to zero as the traffic load increases i.e. user packets are
able to make full use of the available network throughput
capacity as traffic load increases.
Our analysis is made complicated by (i) the non-preemptive
nature of traces, namely once a trace has started it will
continue until its alloted time has expired, and (ii) a new
trace can start at any time and so when multiple traces are
active their start (and so end) times need not be not aligned
i.e. the traces may only partially overlap. We therefore begin
by relaxing (ii) and requiring the synchronised start/stop of
traces, and later relax this requirement.
A. Network Setup and Notation
The setup considered is illustrated in Fig 7. Let U =
{1, 2, · · · , nu} denote the set of users, a
(u)
k ∈ N denote
the number of packet arrivals for user u at time k and
a¯(u) := limK→∞
1
K
∑K
k=1 a
(u)
k the average number of packet
2There is no need to manage the termination of traces, each trace simply
stops once its alloted time has expired.
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Fig. 7: Schematic illustrating the VPN gateway setup consid-
ered.
arrivals. Packets for each user u are held in separate queues,
with the queue occupancy for user u at time k being denoted
by q
(u)
k . Letting w
(u)
k ∈ N be the number of packets dequeued
at time k then q
(u)
k+1 = [q
(u)
k +a
(u)
k −w
(u)
k ]
+ where the notation
[·]+ has the usual meaning that [x]+ = x when x ≥ 0 and
[x]+ = 0 otherwise.
User packets are dequeued according to a predefined trace.
Multiple traces may be active simultaneously in order to
increase the rate at which user packets are dequeued. A trace
f is a sequence pj ∈ N, j = 1, 2, . . . , n where pj is the
number of packets to be transmitted at time j and n is the
duration of the trace. Importantly, when no user packets are
available to send at time j, then dummy packets will be
transmitted to ensure that pj packets are always transmitted.
Let P =
∑n
j=1 pj denote the total number of packets in a
trace.
Packets from a trace are queued at the output link before
transmission over the tunnel, see Fig 7. As is usual in Internet
links we leave rate control to the end hosts. If the aggregate
send rate persistently exceeds the output link capacity then the
queue at this link will eventually overflow and cause packet
loss which end hosts can then use as a congestion indicator,
e.g. by using TCP congestion control.
New traces are started as needed to service user packet
arrivals, and multiple traces may be active at the same time so
as to increase the sending rate if needed. Indexing these active
traces by 1, 2, · · · let T denote the set of trace indices, τt the
start time of trace t ∈ T . At time k the set of active traces
is Tk := {t ∈ T : k ∈ {τt, . . . , τt + n}} and the number of
packets that are transmitted at time k is
∑
t∈Tk
pk−τt , therefore∑
u∈U w
(u)
k ≤
∑
t∈Tk
pk−τt . The average rate of packet trans-
missions can be no more than the capacity c in packets/slot
of the outgoing link i.e. limK→∞
1
K
∑K
k=1
∑
t∈Tk
pk−τt < c.
Since
∑
t∈Tk
pk−τt packets are sent then if there are insuffi-
cient user packets available to send at time k we need to send∑
t∈Tk
pk−τt −
∑
u∈U w
(u)
k dummy packets. Our task is to
activate traces and thereby adjust the number of user packets
transmitted w
(u)
k so as to minimise the number of dummy
packets sent while still servicing all of the user packets in a
timely manner.
B. Synchronised Scheduler
To proceed we first assume that active traces start/stop in
a synchronised fashion. Since traces started in slot 1 finish
at slot n, traces started at slot n + 1 finish at slot 2n and
so on then by restricting ourselves to starting traces at times
1, n+ 1, 2n+ 1, . . . we can ensure synchronised start/stop of
k1 2
n 2n
group 
g=1
group 
g=2
upcurlybracketleftupcurlybracketmidupcurlybracketrightupcurlybracketleftupcurlybracketmidupcurlybracketright
⋯ ⋯
Fig. 8: Gathering slots into groups of n consecutive slots. In
the synchronised case a trace can only be activated in the first
slot of a group, and will have completed by the last slot in
that same group since traces are of duration n slots.
traces and avoid partial overlapping of traces. We will relax
this restriction later, but the absence of overlapping traces
simplifies the initial analysis and assists with gaining insight
into the design issues to be considered.
Formally, partition time slots k = 1, 2, . . . into groups of
n slots, see Fig 8. Denote the first group of slots by G1 :=
{1, . . . , n}, the second by G2 := {n+ 1, . . . , 2n} and so on.
A new trace can only be activated at the start of a group of
slots. Letting yg denote the number of traces active in group
g, consider the following trace scheduler:
yg ∈ arg min
y∈[0,ymax]
(γ −QgP )x (2)
Qg+1 = [Qg + bg − ygP ]
+ (3)
where γ > 0 is a design parameter, bg :=
∑
u∈U
∑
k∈Gg
a
(u)
k
is the number of user packet arrivals in group of slots g and
recall P is the total number of packets in a trace.
The following lemma establishes that the scheduler main-
tains a bounded queue for all packet arrival rates up to ymaxP .
Lemma 1 (Queue Boundedness). Consider update (2)-(3).
Suppose that bg ≤ bmax, b¯ = E[bg] and ymaxP > b¯ + ǫ,
ǫ > 0. Then as g → ∞ we have |γ − QgP | ≤ 2δ where
δ := bmax + ymaxP .
Proof. Case(i) γ − QgP > δ. Then yg = 0 and Qg+1 =
[Qg+bg]
+ = Qg+bg since Qg, bg > 0. Hence, γ−Qg+1P =
γ−QgP − bgP . Taking expectations conditioned on Qg, γ−
E[Qg+1|Qg]P = γ −QgP − b¯P
Case (ii) γ − QgP < −δ. Then yg = ymax and Qg+1 =
[Qg + bg − ymaxP ]
+. Since γ −QgP < −δ then Qg > (γ +
δ)/P > ymax. Hence, Qg+1 = Qg + bg − ymaxP and γ −
Qg+1P = γ − QgP − bgP + ymaxP
2. Taking expectations,
γ−E[Qg+1|Qg]P = γ−QgP−b¯P+ymaxP
2 ≥ γ−QgP+ǫP .
Case (iii) |γ − QgP | < δ. Since Qg+1 ≥ 0 then
γ − Qg+1P ≤ γ. For the left-hand bound, we use the fact
that |Qg+1 − Qg| ≤ bmax + ymaxP and so γ − Qg+1P ≥
−δ − (bmax + ymaxP ).
Hence, when |γ − QgP | > δ then γ − E[Qg+1|Qg]P is
strictly decreasing and when |γ − QgP | ≤ δ then it remains
in the ball |γ − E[Qg+1|QgP | ≤ 2δ.
We have the following immediate consequence.
Corollary 1 (Capacity Achieving). Suppose ymax > b¯/P .
Then the mean service rate provided by the traces is sufficient
to serve the mean rate of user packet arrivals. That is, the
trace-based tunnel with scheduler (2)-(3) is capacity achiev-
ing.
8Proof. Observe from (3) that,
Qg+1 ≥ Qg + bg − ygP (4)
and so when Q1 = 0 it follows that
1
g
g−1∑
i=1
(bi − yiP ) = b¯g − y
⋄
gP ≤ Qg/g (5)
where b¯g :=
1
g
∑g−1
i=1 bg and y
⋄
g :=
1
g
∑g−1
i=1 yg . Since, by
Lemma 1, Qg is bounded then
Qg
g
→ 0 as g → ∞ and
therefore b¯g ≤ y
⋄
gP as g → ∞. That is, the mean service
rate provided by the traces is sufficient to serve the mean rate
of user packet arrivals. This holds for every ǫ > 0 such that
ymaxP > b¯+ ǫ.
C. Discussion
The foregoing analysis establishes that the trace-based tun-
nel approach is capacity achieving. Intuitively, as the traffic
load increases the probability increases that a user packet is
available in the queue when a transmission slot arises and so
the number of dummy packets decreases, eventually falling to
zero.
Scheduler (2)-(3) is easy to analyse but rather harsh in that
it selects either ymax or 0 active traces in each group of slots.
This can be alleviated by modifying the scheduler as follows:
xg ∈ arg min
x∈[−1,1]
(γ −QgP )x (6)
yg+1 = [yg + xg]
[0,ymax] (7)
Qg+1 = [Qg + bg+1 − yg+1P ]
+ (8)
where [x][0,ymax] = x when x ∈ [0, ymax] and equals 0 when
x < 0 and ymax when x > ymax. This scheduler is intuitive,
although the use of incremental updates to yg is somewhat un-
usual. Namely, queue Qg measures the accumulated mismatch
between the arrival of user packets and service of packets.
When this mismatch grows too large and exceeds γ/P then
we increase the number of active traces, when the mismatch
falls to less than γ/P we decrease the number of active traces.
We can also relax the synchronisation assumption made in
the previous section by allowing new traces to start in any
slot. This means that traces can, for example, now partially
overlap. The payoff is that the potential exists to exploit this
extra freedom to achieve improved performance, especially
improved delay performance as a result of being able to start
new traces in a more timely way.
As our baseline unsynchronised scheduler we use the fol-
lowing update,
xk ∈ arg min
x∈[−1,1]
(γ −QkP )x (9)
zk+1 = [zk + xk]
[0,ymax] (10)
Qˆk+1 = [Qˆk + α(
∑
u∈U
a
(u)
k −
∑
t∈Tk
pk−τt)]
+ (11)
where a new trace is started in slot k (added to Tk) when zk
increases or when a trace completes and the number of active
traces |Tk| falls below zk.
adversary
BA www
Seculink
user 1
user 2
Fig. 9: Schematic illustrating the tunnel setup considered.
V. IMPLEMENTING A FULLY FUNCTIONAL PROTOYPE
We built a prototype VPN implementation of the scheduler
in (6)-(8) and also of its unsynchronised variant. The entire
project including codes, scripts and datasets for all measure-
ments in this paper is available at [6]. Many of the evaluation
studies of proposed traffic analysis defences in the literature
use a simulation approach whereby previously collected packet
traces are replayed. While easy to implement and fast to run,
this replay approach ignores a number of important effects
when traffic shaping is used. Namely, the buffering associated
with traffic shaping affects the behaviour of the web fetch pro-
cess, e.g. delay of a request has knock-on effects on the timing
of the response which may in turn affect subsequent requests,
and such interactions are not captured by simply replaying a
recorded packet sequence. Further, traffic shaping can interact
with TCP congestion control in unexpected ways that impact
on timing and performance. Translating performance data, not
only on latency and dummy packet overhead but also on
resistence to attack, derived from replay-based evaluations to
real-world usage can therefore be far from straightforward.
While developing a full implementation involves significant
extra time and effort, we argue that it allows more accurate
prediction of real-world performance.
In this section we begin by describing the hardware and
software setup used in our tests and outlining the implemen-
tation approach used. We then discuss how the flexibility in
the scheduler design noted in the previous section can be
exploited to improve latency and how we carry out selection of
trace parameters (duration and rate). We finish by presenting
experimental measurements for both UDP and TCP traffic.
These measurements allow us to evaluate the trade-off between
the delay and dummy packet overheads and how this can be
controlled via the choice of scheduler parameters.
A. Hardware Setup
We begin by describing the hardware setup used. The
network topology is shown schematically in Figure 9. Clients
are connected to the VPN gateway A using an IPSec protected
link. The link between nodes A and B (labelled Seculink) is
the encrypted privacy-enhanced VPN tunnel. This is a public
link, i.e. it is exposed to sniffing from adversaries. Seculink
gateway A is a commodity server with an Intel(R) Core 2 Quad
@2.66GHz CPU and 4GB RAM running Ubuntu 14.04.4 LTS.
The other end of the tunnel, node B, is another commodity
server with an Intel(R) Core 2 Duo @ 3.00GHz and 2GB
RAM running Ubuntu 12.04.5 LTS. Nodes A and B use a
mix of TP-LINK TG-3468 1000Mbps external ethernet cards
and on-board gigabit ethernet cards (RTL8111 PCI Express
and Intel 82567LM-3 respectively) for network connectivity.
90 200 400 600
Time (s)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Arrival rate
Service rate
(a) Synchronised
0 200 400 600
Time (s)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Arrival rate
Service rate
(b) Unsynchronised
Fig. 10: Comparison of tunnel rate adaptation in synchronised
and unsynchronised scenarios.α in synchronised scenario. (du-
ration: 10min, α = 1, P = 1682, n = 9615, c = 20, γ = 100)
Traffic from node B is routed to the Internet via a campus
gateway using a 100Mbps link (it is this link which limits the
network rate since the tunnel between A and B is a gigabit
connection). A NETGEAR JGS516 Gigabit switch is used to
connect client machines to Seculink gateway A. The Seculink
tunnel uses IPSec and traffic shaping to protect against DPI
and traffic analysis attacks. Outgoing traffic from clients is
sent to node B via node A and then forwarded by B to
the campus gateway. Incoming traffic arriving at node B is
forwarded to node A and then sent to the corresponding client.
The proposed tunnel is designed to perform the scheduling
and traffic shaping on aggregated traffic from multiple clients.
However in order to compare traffic patterns before and after
traffic shaping we use a single client generating multiple flows
in the experiments of this section unless stated otherwise.
The client is a Dell Inspiron 15 5000-Series laptop with Intel
Core i3-4005U Processor and 4GB RAM running an Ubuntu
14.04.4 LTS.
B. Software Setup
Both Seculink and the links between clients and node A are
protected with IPSec protocols AES-256 and SHA-256. Traffic
shaping on Seculink is implemented using the netfilter
and netfilter queue libraries in C in conjunction with
the iptables module in Linux. Gateway A queues packets
from clients and transmits them over Seculink using our traffic
shaping scheduler with slots of 1ms duration. When no client
packets are queued for transmission yet the active traces
require a packet to be sent then a dummy packet is generated
and sent. Traffic received at node B is first filtered to remove
dummy packets and remaining packets are then forwarded
to the campus gateway over an unencrypted link. Responses
received from the Internet are treated similarly, transmitted
by node B to node A using our traffic shaping scheduler. In
the UDP experiments traffic is generated using the PERIODIC
method of the MGEN traffic generator. TCP traffic is generated
by using wget to fetch dummy files of various sizes from a
server located in the campus network.
C. Synchronised vs Unsynchronised Schedulers
With a synchronised scheduler traces only start and finish
at the beginning of each cycle, a cycle being the duration of
a trace. This means that when the arrival rate is changed in
the middle of a cycle we have to wait until the start of the
next cycle to update the number of active traces and so when
new flows start they may experience significant delay. This is
particularly an issue when no traces are active in the tunnel
and a new client flow starts since in this case the scheduler
cannot transmit any packets until the next cycle starts (when
some traces are already active the scheduler has the option to
transmit some packets from the new flow e.g. by substituting
for packets from other flows or for dummy packets). Similarly,
when the rate of incoming traffic is less than the rate of a single
trace then sufficient packets need to be queued before a trace
is activated, causing delay.
To mitigate such delays on lightly loaded links, two un-
synchronised modifications are implemented to “wake” the
channel from silence upon sensing new incoming traffic:
1) DNS Triggering. Upon receiving a DNS packet when no
traces are active, a new trace is immediately activated.
2) Use of Running Average When Lightly-Loaded. We main-
tain a running average of packet arrivals, a¯ = (1− ζ)a¯+
ζ
∑
u∈U a
(u)
k , where ζ > 0 is a design parameter. When a¯
exceeds threshold a∗ and no traces are active then a new
trace is activated. In our experiments we use ζ = 0.001,
a∗ = 0.005.
In addition, to avoid adding new traces in response to small
spikes in arrivals, when γ − QˆkP < 0 we only activate a
new trace when also Qˆk − Qˆk−m > 0, where m is a design
parameter. In this way we only respond to a sustained increase
in Qˆ. Similarly, when γ − QˆkP > 0 we only decrease xk
when also Qˆk − Qˆk−m < 0. In our experiments we use m =
100 unless otherwise stated, which is found to provide a good
compromise between responsiveness and sensitivity to small
fluctuations (since slots are 1ms duration, this correponds to
a window of 100ms duration).
To reduce sensitivity to small fluctuations in arrivals we also
modify the Qˆ update to use max{a¯,
∑
u∈U a
(u)
k }, namely:
Qˆk+1 = [Qˆk + α(max{a¯,
∑
u∈U
a
(u)
k } −
∑
t∈Tk
pk−τt)]
+
In this way when the number of packet arrivals falls temporar-
ily a¯ is used instead of ak.
Figure 10 illustrates the impact of these changes, comparing
time histories of the arrival and services rates when using
a synchronised scheduler vs an unsynchronised scheduler. It
can be seen that the unsynchronised scheduler is much more
responsive to changes to traffic load. Not only is the delay
in increasing the service rate in response to increases in
arrival rate reduced (so reducing the delay experienced by
user packets) but also the delay in reducing the service rate
in response to a fall in the arrival rate is also reduced (so
reducing the number of dummy packets transmitted). Since it
has better performance, from now on we will make use of this
unsynchronised scheduler unless otherwise stated.
D. Choice of Trace Parameters
We make use of traces which transmit at a constant rate
for a defined duration. Figure 11 shows measurements of
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Fig. 11: Dummy overhead vs trace rate for a sample website.
For each rate data is shown for traces of duration 1, 2, 4, 8
and 16 seconds. (γ = 4096).
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Fig. 12: Illustrating the effect of trace rate and duration on the
completion time of a sample web page. For each rate the data
shown in (a) is for traces of duration 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16 second.
Similarly, for each duration the data shown in (b) is for rates
of 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0 pkts/ms. (γ = 4096).
the delay and fraction of dummy packets vs the trace rate
and duration. This data is for an example web fetch using
TCP and shows measurements for both the downlink and
uplink (the uplink carries the TCP ACKs). Figure 12 shows
the corresponding impact of the trace rate and duration on
the web fetch completion time. It can be seen from these
plots that increasing the trace rate reduces completion time
but increases the dummy packet overhead, but the duration
of trace has limited effect on completion time. The dummy
packet overhead for different trace durations is also shown in
Figure 13.
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Fig. 13: Illustrating the effect of trace duration on dummy
overhead for a sample website. For each duration the data
shown for rates of 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0 pkts/ms. (γ =
4096).
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Fig. 14: Comparison between dummy and delay rates for CBR
UDP traffic and different choices of γ. Given the negligible
variance, average over 5 tests are presented for each γ. (dura-
tion: 5min, a¯ = 2800, α = 1, P = 1682, n = 9615, c = 20).
Values for each γ are averaged over 5 tests (error bars are not
shown since they are too small to be clearly visible).
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Fig. 15: Comparison between delay and dummy rates vs arrival
rate for CBR UDP traffic with γ = 1024. (duration: 5min,
α = 1, P = 1682, n = 9615, c = 20). Values are averaged
over 5 tests.
The duration and rate of a trace also has an effect on
the ability to defend against attacks. As explained in Section
III-B, pages that are served with the same pattern of traces
are indistinguishable to an attacker. Web pages that can be
fetched using only one or two traces are likely to share the
same pattern since there are few ways in which a small number
of traces can be generated. However when the number of traces
needed to fetch a web page increases then the chance of having
distinct patterns is increased. Hence, better privacy is achieved
by selecting the trace parameters such that the tunnel is able
to serve most websites using only a small number of traces.
Based on these considerations and the data in Figure 11-13 we
selected a trace of duration 9s and rate 0.2 pkts/ms (n = 9615
slots and P = 1682 packets, slots are of 1ms duration) and
use these parameter values for the rest of our experiments.
E. Performance with CBR UDP Traffic
In this section we study throughput efficiency and delay
performance with constant bitrate (CBR) UDP arrivals. By
throughput efficiency we mean the mismatch between the
transmit rate of the scheduler and the arrival rate of client
packets. Recall that when there are insufficient client packets
buffered at the scheduler then the scheduler transmits dummy
packets so that its transmissions can continue to follow the
predefined trace pattern. These dummy packets provide resis-
tance to traffic analysis attacks but increase the load on the
network and so we would like to minimise these. There is a
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fairly direct trade-off between delay and the volume of dummy
packets transmitted since by increasing the backlog of client
packets buffered at the input to the scheduler we reduce the
need for dummy packets but increase the delay experience
by client packets. Conversely, reducing the number of client
packets buffered tends to increase the need for dummy packets
but decrease delay.
This trade-off between throughput efficiency and delay can
be seen in Figure 14, which plots measurements of the delay
and dummy rate vs scheduler parameter γ which directly
influences the queue backlog (with increases in γ increasing
the backlog). The dummy rate value shown is the ratio of
the dummy packets sent to the total number of packets sent
(dummy plus processed packets). Note that there is no packet
loss within the scheduler in these tests. It can be seen from
Figure 14 that as γ is increased the delay rises but the rate at
which dummy packets are sent falls. Observe, however, that
even for relatively small values of γ the dummy rate remains
reasonably small, which is encouraging.
Figure 15 shows corresponding measurements of delay and
dummy rate as the arrival rate is varied (scheduler parameter γ
is held constant at 1024 in these plots). It can be seen that the
delay tends to increase with arrival rate and the dummy rate to
fall. This can be understood by noting that as the arrival rate
rises more user packets tend to be buffered at the scheduler.
Hence, the delay rises but also user packets are more likely
to be available when a transmisison opportunity occurs and
so the number of dummy packets needed falls. Importantly,
observe that the delay is consistently reasonable, rising to no
more than 275ms at higher arrival rates, despite the extensive
traffic shaping being carried out. Also, the decrease in dummy
rate with increasing arrival rate means that the throughput
efficiency increases with increasing load, so mitigating the
dummy packet cost incurred by the traffic shaping.
F. Performance with TCP Flows
We finish this section by presenting data on the scheduler
performance with TCP traffic (for the default Linux Cubic TCP
variant). Figure 16 plots measurements of delay and fraction
of dummy packets vs design parameter γ when fetching a
1024MB file from a campus server using wget. Data is shown
for both the downlink and uplink, the packet rate on the uplink
being roughly half of that on the downlink due to delayed
acking by TCP. It can be seen that the delay increases with γ,
as expected, but remains less than 100ms even for relatively
large values of γ. The fraction of dummy packets is relatively
insensitive to γ when using TCP and remains consistently
below 20%.
Figure 17 plots the measured completion time vs file size
fetched. For comparison, the corresponding data is also shown
for a link with no traffic shaping. It can be seen that the cost,
in terms of increase in completion time, is modest. Figure 18
provides additional detail, showing measured data on delay
and dummy rate vs file size. It can be seen that the delay and
dummy rate both tend to fall as the file size increases. The
effect here is due to the time that it takes the scheduler to adapt
to the arrival of a new flow: for longer flows this adaptation
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Fig. 16: Measurements of delay and fraction of dummy packets
vs γ for TCP traffic. The data is measured fetching a 1024MB
file, the average over 5 tests is presented for each γ (α = 1,
P = 1682, n = 9615, c = 20).
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Fig. 17: Completion time vs file sizes when using TCP, γ =
1024. Results are shown both for the traffic shaped tunnel and
for an unprotected link (no encryption, no traffic shaping).
Values are averaged over 5 runs.
overhead gets washed out and amortised over many packets
but for short flows its effect is more pronounced. This can be
seen in Figure 19, which shows time histories of the number
of active traces on both the downlink and uplink (uplink traces
are carrying the TCP acks and so are fewer in number). The
experiment is conducted by fetching a file of size 8192MB.
The link reaches steady state in about 20 seconds.
VI. EVALUATION OF PRIVACY PERFORMANCE
In this section we begin by collecting experimental mea-
surements of the sequence of traces generated by fetching of
each of the Alexa top 100 finance and health web sites in
Ireland. Recall that the sequence of traces generated is affected
by interaction between TCP and the traffic shaping applied,
and so a simple replay approach is not appropriate. Note
also that the activation of traces is not synchronized with the
start of a web fetch and there may be an offset between the
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Fig. 18: Comparison between dummy and delay rate when
using TCP to fetch files of different sizes, for γ = 1024. Box
plots for values of 5 runs are shown.
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Fig. 19: Illustrating convergence speed of active traces for
uplink and downlink. The active traces approach channel
capacity only 20 seconds into the fetch. Note that expected
value of uplink capacity is half the value of downlink and that
is due to TCP protocol sending one ACK for every two data
packets.
beginning of a fetch and the activation of the first trace whose
duration depends on the user’s previous network activity and
the duration of the silent period (if any) before the start of a
fetch. There is also a random offset between the activation of
traces in the outgoing and incoming directions which depends
on the link speed, previous traffic history and TCP protocol
behaviour. These random offsets lead to variations in the
sequence of traces generated by repeated fetches of the same
web site. The sequence of traces generated also depends on
the choice of scheduler and trace parameters, for which we use
the values derived from the analysis in the previous section.
Using the collected experimental trace data we carry out a
simplified indistinguishability analysis i.e. an analysis of how
many combinations of web fetches are consistent with each
measured trace. We then evaluate the performance of the trace-
based approach under the state of the art k-NN attack from
[21]. This attack uses a large number of features and so is
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Fig. 20: Examples of trace time histories recorded when
fetching the home pages of four websites from the Alexa top
100 finance and health web sites in Ireland. (P = 1682, n =
9615, c = 20, γ = 1024)
rather computationally demanding but as noted by Panchenko
et al [18] it provides benchmark that outperforms all previous
attacks3. We also evaluate the performance of the approach
against the attack from [18] which uses fewer features and
SVM to classify web pages.
A. Trace Sequences Generated by Alexa Top 100 Web Sites
We fetched each of the home pages from the Alexa top 100
finance and health web sites in Ireland 100 times using the
Seculink VPN (so 10,000 fetches in total). Note that several of
these pages include dynamic AJAX content as well as adverts
etc which can change between fetches. Figure 20 shows four
example trace time histories recorded during these fetches.
It can be seen that the trace time histories in Figures 20a
and 20c are identical and so evidently these two web pages
cannot be distinguished by an attacker. Figure 21 plots the
number of distinct trace time histories measured on the uplink
and downlink while fetching the 100 web pages and also the
number of pages for which each trace time history is observed.
It can be seen that certain trace time histories are generated
by 10-30 different web pages and so these web pages are
indistinguishable to an attacker.
It can also be seen in Figure 21 that around 20 trace time
histories are generated by a single web page, and so potentially
vulnerable to attack. An example is shown in Figure 20d.
Evidently the trace time history in Figure 20d cannot be
distinguished from two fetches of the web sites in Figures
20a and 20c. The trace time history in Figure 20b is more
complex, and raises the question of whether there exists one
or more combinations of web page fetches that yield the same
3The attack introduced in [18]] uses fewer features and scales better but
since it is reported to have broadly similar performance to the k-NN attack it
seems reasonable to use the k-NN attack of [21] as a baseline for comparison.
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Fig. 21: Counts of the number of web pages generating each
distinct web trace time history.
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Fig. 22: Comparison between trace time histories from two
different browsing sessions. In (a) a single web page is fetched
while in (b) three Google search queries fare conducted on
concurrent tabs with a 0.2s time gap between fetches. (P =
1682, n = 9615, c = 20, γ = 1024).
trace time history and so cannot be distinguished from this
web fetch.
As an illustrative example we collected 10 samples for
each of the two following browsing behaviours (i) a web
page from our data set is fetched on a single tab and (ii)
on three concurrent tabs, the words ”invisible”, ”history” and
”browsing” are queried from Google search with a 0.2 second
gap between queries. The measured trace time histories are
plotted in Figure 22. It can be seen that the time histories
look very similar, thus allowing a user to plausibly deny that
they fetched the single sensitive web page since the observed
trace time history might equally have been generated by non-
sensitive google queries.
B. Indistinguishability Analysis
We can analyse the indistinguishability of the traces asso-
ciated with the Alexa data more formally as follows. The
analysis is basically that of a packing problem, namely
given an observed sequence of traces what combinations of
web fetches are compatible with that sequence i.e. what
combination of other trace sequences (since each web fetch
generates a sequence) can be packed into a given observed
sequence of traces. Let H denote the set of measured trace
sequences generated by the Alexa web pages. For trace
sequence h ∈ H we can determine (by exhaustive search)
the combinations Ch,1, Ch,2, . . . , Ch,mh of the other trace se-
quences that are indistinguishable from h, where combination
Ch,i = {(hi,1, n1), (hi,2, n2), . . . } with hi,j ∈ H\{h} and nj
the number of times that hi,j is repeated in the combination.
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Fig. 23: Probability P(ω) that web page ω was fetched given
an observed trace time history vs ω and assuming equiprobable
combinations.
Of course not all combinations are equally likely and for
plausible deniability we need there to be several combinations
that have reasonably high probability. As already noted, there
are two main difficulties with actually carrying out probability
calculations however. One is that the probability of fetching
a page is usually unknown and user dependent, although it
might be estimated from historical data. The other is that the
pages fetched may be correlated, and again would have to be
estimated from historical data. With these caveats in mind, we
can still gain insight under some simplifying assumptions.
Let Wh denote the set of single web pages that generate
trace sequence h, so |Wh| is the number of single web pages
that generate h (see Figure 21). Let the web page fetchedW be
a random variable that takes values in ∪h∈HWh. Assume, for
simplicity, that the web pages inWh are fetched independently
and are equally likely to be fetched. Then when combination
Ch,i is observed the probability that page ω was fetched is,
P(W = ω|Ch,i)
=
∑
(h,n)∈Ci:ω∈Wh
n∑
j=1
(
n
j
)
1
|Wh|
j
(1−
1
|Wh|
)n−j (12)
Let C be a random variable which is the combination
used. Assume, again for simplicity, that each combination
Ch,1, Ch,2, . . . , Ch,mh is equally probable when trace h is
observed, i.e P(C = Ch,i) = 1/mh. Then the probability
that web page ω was fetched given that trace time history h
was observed is,
P(W = ω|h) =
mh∑
i=1
P(W = ω|Ch,i)/mh (13)
When the traces h ∈ H are equally likely to be observed
then P(W = ω) = 1|H|
∑
h∈H P(W = ω|h). Figure 23 plots
P(W = ω) calculated using (13) for each of the 100 web
pages, sorted in increasing order. It can be seen that this
probability is less than 0.08 on the downlink and less than
0.05 on the uplink. We can conclude therefore that with the
foregoing assumptions the user can reasonably deny that page
ω was fetched despite an attacker observing the transmitted
packet trace.
To get a sense of the sensitivity of these values to the
assumption of equiprobability, for comparison, let h∗ ∈
argminh∈H P(W = ω|h) and suppose that this worst case
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Fig. 24: Probability P(ω) that web page ω was fetched given
an observed trace time history vs ω and assuming worst
combination has probability one.
trace h∗ is always observed i.e. P(W = ω) = P(W = ω|h∗).
Figure 24 shows the calculated P(W = ω|h∗) for our mea-
sured web fetches. It can be seen that P(W = ω|h∗) is higher
than in Figure 23, as expected, and indeed reaches one but
only for a small number of web pages. Hence, even in this
worst case a user has fairly level of strong deniability.
C. Performance Against State of the Art Attacks
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed
trace-based approach against two state of the art attacks
namely the k-NN attack from [21] and the SVM attack from
[18].
The attack from [21] uses a large number of features,
including packet timing information and the duration of trans-
mission, and has state of the art performance. We note that
the attack assumes (i) web pages are fetched individually
and sequentially, one at a time, and (ii) the start and end of
each web fetch is known. The assumption that web pages are
fetched sequentially is a strong one and can be expected to
greatly reduce the indistinguishability of the trace sequences
generated by the Seculink tunnel (since it excludes from
consideration all combinations of web fetches consistent with
an observed trace sequence other than those involving a single
web fetch). Knowledge of the start and end of each web
fetch also need not be straightforward to obtain in practice,
especially when a trace-based defence is used, and we assist
the attack by explicitly providing this information.
Figure 25 shows the measured performance of the attack
against the Alexa pages fetched via the Seculink tunnel. Each
web site is fetched 100 times and 10-fold cross validation is
used where training and test data are both collected from the
tunnel. The median, 25 and 75 percentiles plus outliers of the
attack success rate are shown for each page. We note that the
pages considered here include dynamic content such as AJAX,
adverts, tweets etc. The relatively low spread in success rates
for each web page seen in Figure 25 suggests that this content
has little impact on the performance of proposed attack or
defence.
The mean success rate of the attack is 18%. This is
surprisingly low given the extra help given to the attacker by
the assumption of sequential web page fetches and knowledge
of the start/end times of each fetch, and so quite encouraging.
It can be seen that a handful of websites suffer from a higher
success rate (the web sites are ordered by success rate in Figure
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Fig. 25: Performance of the attack in [21] against the Alexa
top 100 websites when using the Seculink tunnel. Each web
site is fetched 100 times and 10-fold cross validation is used
(splitting training and test data). The box and whiskers indicate
the median, 25 and 75 percentiles plus outliers for each page.
The mean success rate of the attack is 18%, indicated by the
horizontal line.
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Fig. 26: Examples of common and complex traces sequences
generated by the Alexa web pages.
25) and it is these which pull the average success rate up. To
try to gain more insight into why the attack has much lower
success rates against some pages compared to others we plot
the trace sequences of example pages in Figure 26. Most of
websites are served with two back to back traces, see Figure
26a, which is the most common timing pattern among all of the
websites considered. The websites against which the attack is
successful tend to generate more complex trace sequences, see
for example Figure 26b. Since the attacker has the additional
information that web pages are fetched sequentially these more
complex traces can be used to identify a single web page.
However, a less powerful attacker (and perhaps a more realistic
one) which could not rely on this knowledge would be faced
with the fact that many combinations of multiple web fetches
would also be consistent with such an observed trace – this is
easy to see since most web fetches generate only two back to
back traces as shown in Figure 26a. Hence the attack success
rates reported here are likely overly optimistic.
The attack from [18] uses around 100 features to capture
size, direction and ordering of packets in web samples. Al-
though this attack does not explicitly capture packet timing
information, features regarding packet ordering may capture
some of this information. Similarly to the attack from [21] this
attack also assumes that web pages are fetched individually
and sequentially and that the beginning and ending of each
capture is known to the attacker. Using fingerprints generated
15
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Fig. 27: Best performance of the attack in [18] against our
baseline Alexa top 100 websites when using the Seculink
tunnel. The SVM parameters are c = 2048 and γ = 0.5.
The mean success rate of the attack is 26%, indicated by the
horizontal line.
from features, the attack uses an SVM with parameters c and
γ to classify web site samples. The algorithm tries different
values for c and γ to find those which achieve the highest
accuracy.
Figure 27 shows the highest measured performance of the
attack against the same dataset used with the previous k-
NN attack. The SVM parameters for this highest accuracy
measurement are c = 2048, γ = 0.5. We used 100 features
following a recommendation from authors in [18] that suggests
no significant increase in classification is observed beyond this
value. Again 10-fold cross validation is used where training
and test data are both collected from the tunnel and the median,
25 and 75 percentiles plus outliers of the attack success rate
are shown for each page.
The mean success rate of the attack is 26%. Again given the
extra help given to the attacker by the assumption of sequential
web page fetches and knowledge of the start/end times of each
fetch, the results are surprisingly low. For comparison, in [18]
the authors report a success rate of 91% against Tor traffic in
a closed world scenario using 104 features with 90 instances
from each website.
D. Comparison with A State of the Art Defence
We compare the dummy packet overhead of the trace-based
approach against that of the Supersequence defence proposed
in [21], which also adopts an indistinguishability approach
(referred to as an anonymity set approach in [21]) to enhancing
privacy. The Supersequence defence first clusters websites by
similarity and then represents each cluster using a candidate
supersequence. This requires the prior knowledge of web site
packet traces and so as well as requiring the maintenance
of a trace database not just for each user/device but also
for each location since the packet trace generated by a fetch
depends on the properties of the access link) it also need not
work well with previously unseen web pages. We use code
kindly supplied by the authors of [21] but note that this uses
a simulation/replay approach which, as discussed previously,
does not take account of the impact of traffic shaping on
the web fetch packet trace and so some caution is needed
when comparing the overheads reported for the Supersequence
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Fig. 28: Measured bandwidth overhead for the Supersequence
defence and the proposed trace-based defence. The Superse-
quence defence uses the first 40 websites to learn clusters and
then defends the following 60 websites.
defence and for the full Seculink implementation of the trace-
based defence.
Figure 28 shows the measured bandwidth overhead (the
measure used in [21]) of both approaches for the Alexa web
sites. It can be seen that the overheads are broadly similar for
both, although generally somewhat higher for the trace-based
defence (although bear in mind the caveat that this uses a full
implementation rather than a replay-based simulation).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduce a low overhead capacity-
achieving tunnel that is resistant to traffic analysis in the sense
that it provides deniability to users that any specified web page
was fetched given that a specified packet trace is observed
on the tunnel. We present a scheduler design for managing
the transmission of traces to satisfy user traffic demand while
maintaining reasonably low delay and throughput overhead
due to dummy packets. Experimental results are also presented
demonstrating the effectiveness of this scheduler under a range
of realistic network conditions and real web page fetches.
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